Iraq's foreign fighters: few but deadly

One of their paper's "primary conclusions is the unsettling realization that the vast majority of Saudi militants who have entered Iraq were not terrorist sympathizers before the war; and were radicalized almost exclusively by the coalition invasion."

Relying on interviews with US and Saudi intelligence officials, as well as the findings of the Saudi National Security Assessment Project, which is directed by Obaid and is described as a private group, the paper says that Algerians make up the largest group of foreign fighters at 20 percent, followed by Syrians (18 percent), Yemenis (17 percent), Sudanese (15 percent) and Egyptians (13 percent).

Because Turkey and Iran are less hospitable to foreign extremists, and the Saudi border is a well-patrolled harsh desert, Syria has been the principal means of entry for foreign fighters into Iraq.

Syria's 380-mile border with Iraq is well traveled and porous. In a guide for would-be Jihadis posted on Internet forums, a "Mujahidin" who calls himself Al Muhaijar al-Islami, urges brothers to make the crossing along the Syria-Anbar Province border in Eastern Iraq, according to a translation of the document provided by Evan Kohlman, a New York-based terrorism consultant.

Al Islami says "close connections" among Sunni Arab tribes - like the Shamar who live on both sides of the border and whose influence stretches into Saudi Arabia - make passage easier, as does their disdain for the central Syrian government.

He says the large number of scattered villages there, and frequent engagements with US forces in cities like Al Qaim, make it possible to walk into Iraq in 30 minutes.

He warns militants to shave their beards, carry cigarettes (most Salafis don't smoke), and avoid shortening their robes after the fashion of Salafis.

Cordesman and Obaid's findings seem to back up Al Islami's advice. They point out that 270,000 Saudis visited Syria alone in the first half of this year.

"Separating the legitimate visitors from the militants is nearly impossible," they write. "The problem of successfully halting the traffic of Saudis through Syria into Iraq is overwhelmingly difficult, politically charged, and operationally challenging."

In the end, while they're worried about the potential for foreign fighters to spread terrorism and violence to their homelands once they leave Iraq, they argue that pacifying the country is now far from a simple counter-insurgency operation.

"The outcome in Iraq is going to be determined by how well Iraq's political process can find an inclusive solution to bringing Arab Sunnis, Arab Shiites, Kurds, and Iraqi minorities into a state that all are willing to support,'' they write. "Military action, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism cannot unite or build a country."

• To read the entire CSIS report go to www.csis.org/press/wf_2005_0919.pdf.

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