What we know so far - and what we don't

Perhaps no single issue contributed to the slow-footedness of the initial Katrina response more than lack of leadership structure. As is now well-documented, top officials had little idea of who was in charge of what, when.

On Aug. 29, for instance, FEMA director Mr. Brown was in Baton Rouge, La. He has said he repeatedly warned his superiors in Washington that state and local officials were at odds, or not communicating, and that he was struggling to establish a "unified command."

The next day, 36 hours after the storm first hit, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Michael Chertoff finally issued a memo that declared FEMA's Brown the "principal federal official" to coordinate Katrina response. He also declared the storm an "incident of national significance," invoking the full powers of the National Response Plan.

Yet Mr. Bush had already declared the area a disaster zone on Aug. 27, prior to the storm making landfall. Some DHS officials believe that that declaration had already involved the NRP, making Mr. Chertoff's later move irrelevant.

Not that state and local officials were looking for the feds to provide an on-site hurricane czar, they say. In one instance, Louisiana Gov. Kathleen Blanco (D) turned down an attempt by Washington to assert more authority. On Sept. 2, she refused to sign over her 13,000 National Guard troops to federal control. She worried that the request was political, allowing Washington to depict prior failures as her fault.

There is one national resource over which the White House has unquestioned command: the active-duty military. And in the wake of Katrina, some in Washington think the Pentagon should be more involved in the immediate response to disasters, whether they be storms or terrorist attacks.

Sen. John Warner (R) of Virginia, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, sent President Bush a letter last week saying it may be time to rethink long-standing laws that hinder the ability of active-duty troops to operate in the US.

These laws, such as the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, generally prohibit the military from being used for domestic law enforcement. They were originally enacted to protect the nation against even a hint of military tyranny.

In part, this may be a reaction to reports that frustrated military units were held up prior to deployment to the Gulf, or never deployed at all. Units of the 82nd Airborne were reportedly put on alert on Aug. 30, for example, but then not immediately sent. Some military helicopter units in the Gulf felt they could have easily flown rescue missions, but were not tapped soon enough.

Specialized active-duty military personnel did begin racing toward the Gulf in Katrina's immediate wake. Air Force search-and-rescue teams, which include active, reserve, and Guard airmen, were at work in the region within 36 hours. But it was not until six days after the hurricane had hit land that Bush announced deployment of a large number of active-duty troops: 7,200, including Marines.

This is a separate issue from that of the strength of local National Guards. Louisiana has 3,000 Guard troops serving in Iraq, and it's not yet clear whether this had any effect on the ability of state guard commanders to respond to the storm.

As Katrina's lessons are sorted, sober conclusions are already being drawn. "The Katrina disaster and the failure of leadership at so many levels ... has had to have encouraged terrorists," said former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, a member of the 9/11 commission, last week.

Local, state, and federal officials all need to take action, said Lehman, "before it's too late."

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