Iraqi constitution must deliver oil to Sunnis, or it won't deliver stability

There are two big problems, however. First, the temporary constitution promulgated in early 2004 under Paul Bremer specifically assured Sunnis that Iraq's natural resources belong to "all the people of all the regions and governorates of Iraq," and further underscored that oil revenue would be distributed equally and fairly through the national budget. Effectively the Kurds are demanding all the autonomy protections afforded them by that interim document while trying to remove the key resource-distribution provision important to the Sunnis.

Second, if successful, this Kurdish action will establish a precedent that Shiites may seek to emulate in the south, where almost all the rest of Iraq's oil is found. The Sunnis would probably see such a constitution as a deal struck between Shiites who will eventually dominate Iraq's central institutions and Kurds who covet eventual separation - and one that deprived them of their fair share of Iraq's national resources as well. The insurgency could become a civil war, if Sunni Arabs intensified their attacks on Shiite-dominated security forces and mobilized against Kirkuk or other oil-rich sectors of the country. Bosnia-style, mass ethnic cleansing could result; so could major damage to Iraq's oil infrastructure. And since the Sunni Arabs would probably lose the conflict, their region might then wind up a miniature version of what Afghanistan was in the 1990s - a safe haven for jihadists.

Unfortunately, focused as it has been on the foreign jihadist threat, the US has lost sight of how sectarian tensions have become the leading threat to Iraq's stability. The critical mistake was made after January's elections, when Washington insisted that Iraqis' courageous march to the polls was proof of their desire to be free. While partly true, undoubtedly, this interpretation obscured the degree to which Shiites in particular were voting to further their group aspirations and not simply to uphold democracy in the abstract.

In the waning hours of critical constitutional dealmaking in Iraq, the stakes are too high for the US to take a hands-off approach and provide only friendly, discreet coaching from the sidelines. Without a fair deal ensuring that most Iraqi oil revenue is treated as a national resource, to be distributed proportionately to regions on a per-capita basis, it is hard to see how the Iraqi constitution can defuse Sunni Arab paranoias - and hard to see how it can serve the broader goal of creating a stable democratic Iraq.

• Edward P. Joseph coordinated democracy assistance to the Interim Iraqi government under a US Agency for International Development grant in fall, 2004; Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and founder of the Iraq Index there.

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