A tale of oscilloscopes ... and proliferation risks

At first Asher Karni declined to pursue the purchase of the triggered spark gaps - sophisticated switches that can be used to detonate nuclear bombs. But his Pakistani customer persisted. So on June 17, 2003, Mr. Karni, an Israeli electronics dealer living in South Africa, sent a fateful e-mail that said simply: "WILL DO."

At least that's what recently released court documents allege. Karni was arrested over a year ago when he tried to enter the US for a family ski vacation. He's since pleaded guilty to arranging illegal export of nuclear-related equipment, and agreed to cooperate with investigators to wrap up more of the ring, according to the court papers.

The question raised by the little-noticed Karni case is a frightening one: Are the proliferators proliferating? Last year Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan publicly admitted that he had shared nuclear secrets with paying customers. Karni's confession appears to indicate that at the least there are other supplier networks out there - though perhaps not at A. Q. Kahn's level of sophistication.

Shadowy, nonstate merchants of nuclear technology have become all too common in recent years, noted the recent report of the commission on US intelligence failures. They operate under a veil of secrecy that is difficult to pull aside, cloaking their movements via front companies and international associates.

"It is the misfortune of our age to witness the globalization of trade in the ultimate weapon of mass destruction," says the report of the commission, which was cochaired by Judge Laurence Silberman and former Sen. Charles Robb.

This week many of the world's nations will debate proliferation controls at a five-year review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), held at the UN in New York. The NPT is supposed to function as an overarching framework for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. Debate over the twin nuclear crises of North Korea and Iran will likely dominate the session.

But the effort to control nukes takes place at many levels, from the halls of the UN to police on the street. The case of Asher Karni shows the view from the fight's front lines.

The Karni affair began in the later months of 2002. Many of its details surfaced only in April, when the US District Court for the District of Columbia unsealed documents related to Karni's guilty plea.

Not that the case is truly over yet - federal prosecutors continue to pursue leads to other companies and individuals uncovered during their investigation. Karni has not yet been sentenced, though he likely will be soon. And his alleged customer in Pakistan - one Humayun Khan, according to court documents - has been indicted by a federal grand jury here. US authorities are trying to extradite Mr. Khan from Pakistan.

On the outside Asher Karni has long appeared to be nothing more than a prosperous dealer in electronics parts. He has lived in South Africa since 1985, when he moved there following his discharge from the Israeli army. A top salesman at an established local high-tech firm, he set up his own company, Top-Cape Technology, in 2002.

One customer he brought with him was Humayun Khan (no known relative of A.Q. Khan), head of a Pakistani firm named Pakland, which, according to the US government, specialized in obtaining electronics products of US origin.

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