New gaps in controlling the spread of nuclear arms

Existing global stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium - the fissile materials that fuel nuclear bombs - probably constitute the biggest threat to nonproliferation, experts say. And that is one reason the developing world's heightened interest in nuclear power is so worrisome, they add: In a decade or so, more reactors could result in a larger - and potentially less controllable - stockpile of raw materials.

That is why some find China's talk of supplying Pakistan with more nuclear reactors so alarming - especially given Pakistan's history as a supplier of the world's clandestine nuclear bazaar.

In recent Senate testimony, Robert Joseph, the administration's nominee for undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, said that the China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation under way is under international safeguards. He downplayed the likelihood of China pursuing additional projects with Pakistan.

But at the same time, another State Department official acknowledges that discussions between the two countries about additional nuclear reactors are "worrisome."

Others are still more categoric.

"This is a big concern," says Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. He points to Pakistan's refusal to sign on to an additional protocol to the NPT that calls for countries receiving new facilities to accept international safeguards, and cites Pakistan's history in supplying parts to international nuclear markets.

But the US has weakened its ability to object because of its own participation in the nuclear reactor marketplace, he says.

Pointing to a $5 billion deal for the Westinghouse Electric Co. to supply China with nuclear power plants, and to recent discussion by US officials of selling reactors to India, Mr. Sokolski says, "Either President Bush wasn't serious when he said [in 2004] that the additional protocol should be the condition for these sales, or we need to rethink what we are proposing to sell to China and to India."

Developing nations' insistence that they have a right to obtain nuclear technology as a source of energy is one issue the NPT review must confront. But some say that just as contentious is the US drive to build a new arsenal of replacement nuclear warheads.

"One of the key issues of the conference will be how the nuclear states are doing at fulfilling their own nuclear disarmament commitments," says the Arms Control Association's Mr. Kimball.

The administration wants to go ahead with feasibility studies that could result in a new generation of replacement warheads within a decade. But that runs contrary to disarmament commitments the US made at NPT reviews in 1995 and 2000, Kimball says. "For the US to ask others to take on additional commitments while disregarding its own commitments to the NPT is a recipe for division," he says. "You're basically assuring a lack of progress towards the very goals the US says it supports."

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