A symbol of moderation exits

"That Powell would leave at some point is not the surprise, but the timing is a bit unexpected and unsettling," says one European official, noting that among other things Powell will attend a high-level meeting of Iraq's neighbors in Egypt later this month. "We hope he does not end up viewed as a lame duck."

Many Europeans, in particular, view Powell's departure with trepidation. "He was the one member of this team who knew about working with allies and showed he understood why that is important," says the European official. "He still sold US foreign policy, but he reached out and didn't just tell us about decisions already taken."

In the days since Bush's reelection, speculation had built that Powell was in fact likely to stay on for some time. The theory was that he was energized both by the president's victory and by the renewed opportunities for diplomacy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the death of Yasser Arafat. But some analysts now speculate that it may be the president who wants someone closer to his way of thinking in the top diplomatic post.

"After Arafat left the scene [Powell] would have liked to do something closer to what [Henry] Kissinger and [George] Schulz did - the shuttle diplomacy," says Lawrence Korb, a former Pentagon official in the Reagan administration who worked with Powell in the past. "He would have preferred that as his legacy. But maybe the president was not as keen as he was on that model."

Noting the string of other areas where Powell supported a different tack - from North Korea to Iraq - Korb says Powell may have "read the writing on the wall" and decided to resign now.

Despite often being at odds with the White House on policy, Powell knew whom he worked for. He was aware that his job was to promote the president's foreign policy. As a result, his legacy is likely to be that of the "good soldier" who put a kinder, gentler face on a foreign policy that detoured from the traditional American path in an era of heightened terrorism.

"I think he [Powell] thought he would shape foreign policy," says Mr. Korb. "But as it turned out it was really done by Vice President Cheney and [Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld. He thought it would be him, and instead it was them."

Certainly, one disappointment for Powell is likely to be that, in the absence of any flashy diplomatic success, his presentation on Iraq to the UN in February of 2003 will probably live on for many around the world as their image of this secretary of state. As it turned out, much of the intelligence Powell cited in his map- and photo session of Iraq's weapons programs was faulty. The rest of the administration moved beyond the WMD argument, finding other justifications for the Iraq war.

But Powell remained troubled by the damage the presentation caused to US credibility. He insisted on investigating what happened, and even said he might have thought differently about going to war if he had known the truth about Iraq's arms and status as an imminent threat.

That doubt set him apart from the administration he served, and may be one explanation for why he is leaving it now.

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