Behind Fallujah strategy

A group calling itself the Factions of the Islamic Resistance Movement in Iraq sent a videotaped warning Tuesday to Associated Press television. If US forces invade Fallujah, a masked gunman said, "all military and civilian targets of the occupation" will be targeted, including Iraqi military and government employees who don't quit.

"We will attack them with weapons and military tactics they have not experienced before and in the ways and forms of our choosing," said the gunman, wearing a Saddam-era military uniform and flanked by seven men.

Already, the insurgents have extended the reach of their terror - with kidnappings, car bombs, and attacks on Iraqi police and security forces.

"This is very powerful use of the media, and gives the impression that Iraq is sliding out of control," says Jeremy Binnie, Middle East editor of Jane's Sentinel in London. "The hostage-taking just compounds the blowing up of visible targets. We certainly felt the Ken Bigley saga over here," he adds, referring to the British hostage executed after he was shown for three weeks on video begging for his life.

The disappearance of some 380 tons - the amount is in dispute - of powerfully explosive HMX, RDX and PETN doesn't change the dynamic, as insurgents have shown ingenuity using more conventional materials. But if insurgents have the high explosives, "it does make their job easier," says Binnie. "This way you can pack more punch into a car bomb."

The aim of the Fallujah operation will be to stop such attacks, and extreme options may be on the table. Dodge compares one to the approach taken by the late Syrian leader Hafez al-Assad in the city of Hama in 1982. Not unlike Fallujah today, Mr. Assad then faced "religious extremists, dug into an urban city, that were willing to fight," says Dodge.

Syria's example - which left an estimated 10,000 dead, and large parts of central Hama shelled and bulldozed - has been seen as defining moment of brutality in the battle to eliminate Islamists in the Middle East. But it worked. More than two decades later, such extremists have never again shown themselves in Syria's barren political landscape.

"If [the Americans] want to beat Fallujah, that's the price they're going to have to pay, and I'm not sure they're going to do that," says Dodge. And not all cases have met with similar results. The Israeli military, which has used tough tactics against Palestinian militants for years - including aerial bombardment of urban centers and targeted assassinations of militant leaders - has had only limited success.

Another problem in Iraq, where jobs are scarce and pressure to fight can be strong in disenfranchised Sunni areas north and west of Baghdad, is the growing reach of insurgents. There are believed to be from 20 to 50 separate cells at work, all loyal to ousting American forces and Iraqi allies but only loosely connected.

"That's a huge problem to combat. You can chase and kill one group, but you can't roll it up," adds Dodge. "You can see a technical innovation used in one part of the country spread very quickly. Someone, somewhere, has worked out a very quick way of spreading this stuff. There is geographic and cross-ethnic collusion."

"My gut hunch is that, as soon as [polls close], everything will break loose over there," says Mr. Pike at Globalsecurity.org. "[US forces] will have every sniper in the country go into Fallujah."

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