Blame extends to top for faulty war execution

Reports into the Abu Ghraib prison abuse released this week indict not just the way detainees were handled, but the planning and execution of key aspects of the overall US military enterprise in Iraq.

The nation's leadership, from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on down, failed to anticipate the widespread Iraqi insurgency, according to the reports. The Pentagon failed to adapt quickly enough after the insurgency started. Top generals failed to realize how explosive the Abu Ghraib photos would be.

Mid-level officers who oversaw prisoners will probably lose their careers following the reports' revelations. Secretary Rumsfeld and other command authorities may face renewed questions about larger issues of preparation and responsibility.

"What this keeps coming back to is the fundamental fact of how many troops you needed," says a retired Army general who requested anonymity.

The Abu Ghraib abuses became public this April following publication of photos showing US guards inflicting humiliation and fear on Iraqi detainees. The images showed nude prisoners stacked in piles and otherwise degraded. Some depicted the use of US military dogs to threaten individual Iraqis.

The issue has returned to headlines this week due to several factors: In Germany, court proceedings against some of the lower-level soldiers charged with abuse have reached turning points, and in Washington, two panels charged with investigating Abu Ghraib have made their findings public.

The panels looked at different aspects of the problem. A four-member group headed by ex-Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger examined the overall issue of who in the chain of command should be held responsible for what happened. An Army probe headed by Maj. Gen. George Fay looked at the narrower issue of whether military intelligence personnel contributed to a climate of abuse at Abu Ghraib.

Both panels found that sheer sadism and cruelty on the part of military police guards were a big part of the problem. At a press conference on Tuesday, Mr. Schlesinger referred to an "Animal House" atmosphere that he said pervaded the night shift at Abu Ghraib.

But both panels concurred on larger points: Lax oversight on the part of the chain of command allowed this atmosphere to develop and fester, and abuse wasn't limited to Abu Ghraib.

Of 66 substantiated cases of abuse, eight occurred at the US detention center at Guantánamo Bay, according to the Schlesinger panel report. Three occurred in Afghanistan, and 55 in Iraq.

"Only about one-third were related to interrogation, and two-thirds to other causes," said the Schlesinger report.

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