Terror-war involvement defines court's term

The court, for example, was unable to answer cleanly in a Pennsylvania case whether political gerrymandering of congressional districts can ever violate the constitutional standard of one person, one vote. And rather than simply declaring whether federal law requires disclosure of internal documents related to Vice President Cheney's energy task force, the justices sent the case back to the lower courts with instructions to be more mindful of separation-of-powers concerns.

"It is a term in which everything the court decided will lead to further litigation," says Erwin Chemerinsky, a law professor at the University of Southern California Law School in Los Angeles.

Another dodge came in what many analysts considered to be the most important of the three terror cases. Rather than address the thorny issue of whether an American citizen seized on US soil could be indefinitely detained, the court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds, saying that the lawyer for Jose Padilla filed her lawsuit in the wrong city.

The court's three terrorism cases weren't the only opinions with potential implications for how America fights the terror war. A series of important rulings dealing with domestic law-enforcement tactics are expected to bolster efforts to protect the nation.

The court upheld the use of random highway checkpoints aimed at solving a specific crime, and the court approved suspicionless searches of gas tanks of vehicles entering the US. Both measures could help police search for terror suspects, weapons, or explosives.

The justices also affirmed a Nevada law requiring citizens to identify themselves when requested by police who are investigating a possible crime.

But the centerpiece of the term is the high court's terrorism rulings in the Guantánamo Bay and Yaser Hamdi cases.

In terms of confronting executive power, the high court has had an inconsistent history. When President Truman attempted to take over steel mills during the Korean conflict, the court aggressively asserted its authority and stopped him. But at other times, such as during the World War II internment of Japanese-Americans, the court adopted a more deferential posture until the war ended.

Professor Kmiec says the court's assertion of authority in the terror cases is potentially dangerous. He says judicial second-guessing of military decisions could "make it impossible for the military to conduct the kind of war necessary to defeat an enemy that does not abide by the laws of war."

Others disagree. "We are a nation under a Constitution," says Professor Chemerinsky. "Everything the government does - even waging war - has to be done under the Constitution, and that inevitably means that the judiciary has to be involved in deciding what the Constitution means."

Professor Amar says the court's posture in the terror cases may be more important symbolically. "Years from now we may look back on [the terrorism rulings] with warmness or regret," he says, "but it is an important statement that courts aren't going to just recede into the backdrop."

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