Evidence of possible work on nukes tests Iran's credibility

"They did not anticipate the political reaction from forces inside Iran, that say they sold out the regime," says Semati. "So they had to look tougher."

But if Tehran is trying to appease a domestic constituency, the price may be a loss of credibility in the international community.

"A substantial fraction of European observers confused a big move on the part of Iran [last fall] with a big enough move," says Michael Levi, a nuclear nonproliferation expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington. "In theory, this should be the final demonstration that Iran is acting in bad faith. Iran is confronted with a tough decision. If they turn over more documents, it shows they are more open. But it also proves they did something wrong."

Tough IAEA scrutiny last year led the agency to report that Iran had been hiding a vast clandestine nuclear effort for 18 years. Little direct evidence points to a weapons program, though some experiments point to weapons uses: Iran dabbled in uranium metal; and tests more than a decade ago with polonium-210 are described for the first time by the IAEA in this report.

While polonium can be used for "nuclear batteries," the latest report says, it can also be used, with beryllium, as a "neutron initiator in some designs of nuclear weapons."

Also detailed is Iran's failure to declare design plans for a more advanced centrifuge known as a P-2 - and components manufactured for mechanical testing. The IAEA called the omission "a matter of serious concern" that "runs counter to Iran's declaration."

Inspectors also found two different types of uranium contamination at two separate sites in Iran - raising questions about Iranian claims that the traces came solely from imported equipment.

In one room at the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran, IAEA sampling found uranium enriched to levels 30 times as high as Iran has declared it has achieved using centrifuge technology. Those levels, the report said, "suggests the presence of more than just trace quantities of such material."

"The hole in which Iran was in has stopped shrinking - it got deeper," says a Western diplomat in Tehran, about the discrepancies. "It's not clear if it was an oversight or a deliberate deception, but chances are it's the latter. It doesn't look good for Iran.

"We're worried when bits of information tumble out of the closet," the diplomat says. "It doesn't necessarily mean 'weapons program' when a P-2 turns up. The question is whether there is any link between P-2 components, and the ever- present possibility there could be other facilities."

Iran denies that any more undisclosed facilities exist, and senior officials have been meeting with the IAEA in Vienna this week to take the edge off the new discoveries.

On Tuesday, Iran promised to broaden its temporary suspension of enrichment activities, by halting the assembly of new centrifuges and making new components. Any production under existing contracts will be put under IAEA seal.

"It's very significant, because they can't do anything. Their centrifuges can't spin; uranium can't be enriched," says the Vienna diplomat. "What's clear is that the IAEA is on to them - they probably underestimated the ability of the inspectors."

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