Q&A: Iran's elections
The Monitor's Scott Peterson provides cultural context for the Feb. 20 political contest.
Scott Peterson has reported from Iran extensively in recent years. He spoke with csmonitor.com's Jim Bencivenga.
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What's the most positive development from Friday's elections in Iran?
As with most political events in Iran, the question of what is positive and negative is in the eye of the beholder. Very little happens here that is not seen through the prism of the political battle between the hard-line/conservative camp, and the once-popular reform camp.
On the face of it, for the conservatives, this election - now that around 2,500 reform-minded candidates have been disqualified - will almost certainly yield victory. That will return control of parliament to the right wing, but will also cause new problems for that faction. The turnout is likely to be very low - in keeping with boycott calls from the main reformist party, and just plain apathy on the part of disenchanted voters - which creates legitimacy problems. The conservatives also must create a new model of rule accepted by more Iranians, who have seen their hopes of more democracy and freedoms - codified by three crucial pro-reform votes since 1997 - dashed by conservatives over the years.
What's the most negative development?
The reformists are crying foul, because the unelected Council of Guardians that barred so many candidates has ensured that reformists can't keep their parliament seats. But there is a much broader issue at stake: Most Iranians these days have as little time for reformists as they do for the hard-liners. They have been completely turned off by politics, and in this vacuum, the divisions between extremists on both sides have deepened.
No one is predicting a new revolution, and there is little chance that the fundamental pillar of Iran's Islamic system - divine clerical rule, in the hands of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei - will change anytime soon. There are more calls for that kind of change, especially from the increasingly secular reform camp, but most Iranians will tell you that they don't mind who rules, as long as their regime lets them live their own lives, and make their own political and social decisions.
Were these elections a mere show, with the outcome already determined? How likely is it for a civil war to break out in Iran? If one did, would the conservative clerics or the reformers win?
Civil war on the streets is not likely, though there have been sporadic clashes for the past five years. Instead, expect to see new divisions appearing in the conservative camp, between the hard-liners and the so-called moderate, or "rational" conservatives.
These moderates say they are the ones who, after this vote, will be able to carry out key elements of the reform agenda, and have learned the lesson of the reform experience, that reforms are the key demand of the majority. While there have been a few signs that this faction can have an influence - witness Iran's decision last December to sign the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - there are also many signs that the hard-liners still control everything. For example: 4,000 candidates were at first banned by the Guardian Council, then the Council essentially ignored the Supreme Leader's call that those rejections should be reconsidered.
If the conservatives gain control of the parliament, is the reform movement dead?
Checkmated at almost every turn, the reform movement has been dead for some time. But as reformists often say, its ideals and agenda has now become a bedrock part of Iranian politics and popular demands, even if those who first championed that cause have been unsuccessful in achieving the kind of change they were expecting, after so many landslide electoral victories.
Why has the democratic reform movement run out of gas in Iran?
Critics charge that the movement and reform-minded President Mohamed Khatami misjudged the willingness of conservative, unelected bodies - the judiciary, Guardian Council, etc. - to use extralegal means to force the collapse of the reformists. More than 100 reform newspapers have been shut down. Legislation was never approved. Dozens of political prisoners languish in jail. President Khatami is now accused of proving too weak in the face of that onslaught, and of failing to force accountability on the part of most conservative tools of power.
