As questions mount around the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the intelligence that was used to justify going to war, one of the first casualties may be the Bush administration's doctrine of preventive war.

That is just one way the controversy over the use of intelligence to justify war is likely to impact US foreign policy. Already the wisdom of waging war against a gathering but unexercised threat is being questioned in Congress and among weapons experts.

But the failure to find weapons and the clouds over prewar intelligence are also feeding US allies' doubts on the rationale for war, and solidifying opposition to the administration's stated right to preemptive war.

"People who opposed this war feel vindicated and will feel even stronger about the risks of the doctrine of preventive war, that you have to base it on intelligence that may be flimsy, inaccurate, or can be interpreted in different ways," says Jens Van Scherpenberg at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin.

Calling the last year "difficult for everybody," a European diplomat in Washington says, "We see validation of the importance of inspections, the priority of cooperation, and we will emphasize that as the right way to go forward." Still, to the extent the administration holds to its first-strike policy even in the absence of a proven, imminent threat, defining differences between the US and some allies will continue.

"There is a lasting schism" between the US and some of its allies over the use of military force, fed by specific differences over defense spending, adds Mr. Van Scherpenberg. But he and others in antiwar countries say the underlying differences, while too deep to go away, will be played down in coming months as Europe seeks to repair relations with Washington, and Washington continues to press for international help in postwar Iraq.

European leaders may be hoping the White House has learned from what they believe are the pitfalls of preemptive military action - a doctrine first outlined in the Bush administration's national security strategy of August 2002.

Some experts argue that British Prime Minister Tony Blair - and even Mr. Bush - will be hesitant to repeat the Iraq venture because of public opposition and political scrutiny. In short, observers note, antiwar leaders may not feel compelled to focus on the doctrine's liabilities since others in Washington already are.

In a televised interview this week, former chief US weapons inspector David Kay said, "If you cannot rely on good, accurate intelligence that is credible to the American people and to others abroad, you certainly can't have a policy of preemption."

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