A new way to handle nuclear buildup

US State Department officials were quoted last week suggesting that Russia might halt the reactor project if Iran does not openly declare all its efforts and permit thorough inspections. On Saturday in Vienna, Mr. Rohani reassured Mr. ElBaradei that the IAEA would receive formal notification - possibly by Monday - that Iran will accept intrusive nuclear inspections, sign the Additional Protocol of the NPT, and suspend uranium-enrichment efforts.

"We have been getting satisfactory cooperation from Iran," ElBaradei said. "I hope this is something that will continue." ElBaradei is to provide the IAEA with a fresh report on Iranian compliance soon. Iran has tried to satisfy an Oct. 31 deadline to rectify "failures" found by the IAEA in Iran's reporting of undeclared enrichment activities.

The proliferation issues in Iran - as well as in North Korea - have spotlighted NPT weaknesses. Under the umbrella of the NPT, Pyongyang legally developed its own nuclear-fuel cycle - and then withdrew from the treaty when it decided to make its nuclear-weapons program public. The CIA assesses that North Korea has "produced one or two simple fission-type nuclear weapons."

Analysts fear that Iran could do the same thing, as previously undeclared enrichment programs have come to light in recent months. Though Russia has close nuclear ties with Iran, analysts say the Kremlin was shocked at the extent of Tehran's undeclared efforts. Gottemoeller says that several top Rus- sian officials have told her privately of their embarrassment at finding out about Iran's undeclared centrifuge program at Natanz, and the heavy-water reactor at Arak. As information emerged that several European companies supplied the goods, according to a "shopping list" provided by Pakistan, she adds, the result has been a "sea change" in thinking in Moscow.

"What has changed is that Russia is playing an important role in influencing Iran's cooperation with the IAEA," says NTI's Curtis, a former deputy secretary in the Department of Energy.

ElBaradei has suggested a new security framework that restricts processing of weapon-usable material "exclusively to facilities under multinational control," and called for a similar approach to disposal of spent fuel. All countries should "turn off the tap" on producing new material for weapons under the new framework, he said. Rumyantsev echoed the IAEA leader, with a Russia proposal for several international centers to manage global nuclear fuel supply and waste.

Up-to-date technologies and security would strengthen nonproliferation efforts, and help ease risks from 200,000 tons of material that has built up since the beginning of the nuclear industry, and expands by 10,000 tons a year. "That's where the Russia proposition has resonance," says a Western diplomat in Vienna close to the IAEA. The Russians "should get brownie points for moving toward this process," he says.

Such efforts to centralize nuclear power "are better than the current situation," but will still need work, says Leonard Spector, deputy director of the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Washington. "There are some countries you wouldn't want to have" nuclear energy," Mr. Spector says. "Even if Russia supplies fuel from outside, should Syria have a nuclear power plant?"

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