A better ballot?

Two big flaws, Rubin says, could give rise to any number of nightmare scenarios. The first: The machines' software is encrypted in only the most basic ways, so people with access to a machine before Election Day could easily get into it and, for instance, change the program so that all votes for one candidate go to an opponent. The second: Diebold machines, like comparable machines sold by Sequoia Voting Systems and Election Systems & Software, produce no paper record of a vote, making recounts impossible. A computer science professor, Rubin says he's all in favor of computerizing needless paperwork - but sometimes, in the interest of democracy, you need to kill a few trees.

Diebold rebutted the team's report, arguing it failed to take into account all the checks and balances that ensure election security. Rubin's team argued back that poll workers cannot be expected to make up for security flaws in election machines.

Caught in the crossfire, Maryland put on hold a $55.6 million contract with Diebold to outfit the entire state, and asked Scientific Applications International Corp., an independent research firm, to investigate. Though the firm's report cautiously confirmed some of the Rubin team's findings, it said many flaws could be corrected, and Maryland decided to go ahead with the purchase. Last month, two lawmakers requested a further review of the matter by an independent state agency.

Meanwhile, states are in limbo - awaiting word on the security of DRE machines before spending more on them, as well as late-arriving HAVA funding. The 2002 act mandates numerous state and county reforms, such as establishing reliable voter rolls (many African-Americans were mistakenly cut from Florida's 2000 eligible-voter lists, and in Denver last month, nearly 200 deceased voters were invited to cast absentee ballots).

The law does not require states to install electronic systems, but the technology holds appeal because of its flexibility, says Roy Saltman, a private election- technology consultant. DREs can give instructions in many languages, and can be adapted for visually impaired voters. HAVA requires that all new systems and safeguards be in place by January 2006, a deadline many states expect to miss.

Critics and some proponents of DREs agree on one thing: the need for a paper audit trail so votes can be recounted. A bill now before Congress would add that requirement.

1770s Balloting replaces a show of hands or voice votes. Voters write out names of their candidates in longhand, and give their ballots to an election judge.

1850s Political parties disperse preprinted lists of candidates, enabling the illiterate to vote. The ballot becomes a long strip of paper, like a railroad ticket.

1869 Thomas Edison receives a patent for his invention of the voting machine, intended for counting congressional votes.

1888 Massachusetts prints a ballot, at public expense, listing names of all candidates nominated and their party affiliation. Most states adopt this landmark improvement within eight years.

1892 A lever-operated voting machine is first used at a Lockport, N.Y., town meeting. Similar machines are still in use today.

1964 A punch-card ballot is introduced in two counties in Georgia. Almost 4 in 10 voters used punch cards in the 1996 presidential election.

1990s Michigan is the first to switch to optical scanning, used for decades in standardized testing. One-quarter of voters used the technology in the 1996 election.

2000 A storm erupts over Florida's punch-card ballots and Palm Beach County's "butterfly ballot" in the presidential election.

2002 New federal law authorizes $3.9 billion over three years to help states upgrade voting technologies and phase out punch cards and lever machines. Georgia is the first state to use DRE touch-screen technology exclusively.

Sources: Federal Elections Commission; "Elections A to Z," CQ, 2003; International Encyclopedia of Elections, CQ Press, 2000; League of Women Voters

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