Why road map was left behind

The US-backed peace plan for the Middle East was in jeopardy even before Palestinian Authority Prime Minster Mahmoud Abbas resigned on Saturday.

Problems began months ago. Palestinian President Yassir Arafat fought the political and security reform central to the road map, while Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's government didn't formally accept the plan. Israel instead accepted the "steps" outlined in the road map and then appended 14 reservations.

As the months went by, analysts say, neither side fully complied with the plan, meant to establish a Palestinian state by 2005: Both sides predicated progress on actions the other refused to take.

Israel wanted Palestinians to use force to crush militant groups before it met any of its own obligations. Abbas wanted Israel to ease conditions so that he could win support away from groups such as Hamas and then, perhaps, directly confront militants.

"The level of compliance was minimal from the start. So was the level of American monitoring and determination to oblige the sides to comply," says Joseph Alpher, an independent Israeli strategic analyst. "Given the American sponsorship of the road map, I think that's the more cardinal sin."

Now, with the plan collapsing and the fingerpointing set to start, here is a look at some road-map obligations and how the parties performed.

Palestinian leadership is to declare Israel's right to exist, and call for cease-fire and end to violence. Official Palestinian institutions are to end incitement against Israel.

At the road map's launch on June 4, Abbas said, "our goal is two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side." He added, "we repeat our denunciation and renunciation of terrorism against Israelis." He also said, "we will also act vigorously against incitement and violence and hatred." The PA issued directives to the media meant to curb incitement. In mid-August, Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom acknowledged a decrease in anti-Israel incitement.

The PA security apparatus is to undertake visible efforts to stop violent attacks against Israelis. It is to confront and disarm militant organizations and rid itself of ties to "terror and corruption." Palestinian security services should be consolidated into three services reporting to an Interior Minister. Security cooperation between the PA and the Israeli army should be renewed.

Little of this has happened; security has been the road map's biggest problem. Israel has insisted that Palestinian progress on security precede any Israeli action, while Abbas preferred a cease-fire rather than a confrontation. Israelis said a ceasefire gave militant groups time to regain their strength.

The Israeli army has continued killing militants. The cease-fire disintegrated after a Hamas suicide bombing in Jerusalem on Aug. 19 and an Israeli strike against a Hamas leader two days later.

Under pressure, the PA plugged tunnels used for smuggling weapons from Egypt to Gaza and arrested a few militants.

Abbas faced other internal challenges that contributed to his resignation. From the start, he and Mr. Arafat and their proxies struggled for control of the security services.

While Abbas was also named Minister of the Interior, he effectively delegated the job to Mohammed Dahlan. Arafat recently appointed Mr. Dahlan's rival, Jibril Rajoub, to "reform" the security services, thereby undermining Dahlan. There are still about a dozen security forces, most under Arafat's control.

Palestinians are to appoint an interim, empowered prime minister or cabinet. They are to take steps to appoint ministers able to implement reform; achieve separation of powers, including legal measures.

The Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) confirmed Abbas as prime minister on Apr. 29 after Arafat appointed him to the post and then resisted the arrangement.

Abbas created a new cabinet and outlined a reform program for the Legislative Council, yet he had to struggle with Arafat for authority. Arafat successfully fought many of Abbas's Cabinet nominees and, while most of the Cabinet were loyal to Abbas, prominent members were Arafat loyalists. Prior to Abbas's resignation, many members of the PLC were showing greater allegiance to Arafat, Palestinian analysts say.

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