Iraqi holy men leap into postwar politics

Some outside observers say they take such careful statements at face value.

"In ijtihad, cost-benefit analysis is acceptable," says Gailan Ramiz, who teaches politics at Baghdad University. "If imposing an Islamic state would lead to civil war, it would be better not to have it."

And some ordinary Shiite believers take a pragmatic approach to the prospect of Islamic rule. "My wish is one thing, and reality is something else," says Imad Abdulaziz, chief engineer at Iraqi TV and Radio. "I would like an Islamic government like when the church ruled Europe in the past, but the fact is that the Americans would not allow an Islamic government."

When the time comes for elections to a permanent government, he says, "I would choose someone who respects the Shiite over a fundamentalist Shiite in power, someone with a modern, flexible approach who gives us freedom to pray. But ideally I would like a modern, educated Shiite."

As the different Shiite political and religious leaders begin jostling for position at the starting line of the race for power and influence in post-Hussein Iraq, some observers fear the competition could turn ugly.

A US-backed reformist sheikh, Abdul Mahdi Khoei, was stabbed to death last month at the shrine to Ali, allegedly by followers of Moqtada Sadr. And Sadr's spokesman, Sheikh Adnan al-Shehmani, was bluntly rude Monday when he compared Ayatollah Hakim's exile unfavorably with the Sadr family's decision to stay inside Iraq under Hussein.

But Allawi is optimistic that such disputes will settle down with time. "It is not possible for any person today in the Shiite world to make a claim to leadership without getting the traditional leadership on their side and getting control of Sadr's organization on the streets," he says.

"There are a number of challenges facing the Shiite community," he adds. "But no single current is prepared to jeopardize the potential gains by insisting on narrow interests. They are all united by a common feeling that unless they present a common front about the empowerment of the Shiites, others might like to divide and rule them."

Islam's most significant split began in 632, with the death of its founding prophet, Muhammad.

One faction of his followers - the Sunnis - claimed that Muhammad wanted his successors chosen by consensus. The Shiites argued that the prophet wanted leaders chosen only from his own family line.

The death in AD 680 of Hussein - the prophet Muhammad's grandson - cemented the rivalry between the two major branches of Islam that continues to this day. Hussein was killed in a battle between Sunnis and Shiites at Karbala, now a modern Iraqi city and a holy shrine for Shiite pilgrims.

The Iraqi city of Najaf serves as the base for Iraq's Shiite clergy. Along with Qom, its Iranian counterpart, Najaf is a center for Shiite religious scholarship and political power. It is also the burial place for Ali, the son-in-law of Muhammad and the founder of the Shiite faith.

Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) - A political group with an armed wing of up to 10,000 fighters. The group existed as an Iran-based exile army when Saddam Hussein was in power. SCIRI is led by religious leader Ayatollah Mohammed Bakr al-Hakim.

The Dawa - A well-organized Shiite political party with collective leadership. The Dawa has taken a guarded but supportive stance on efforts to establish a transitional government.

The Hawza - This Najaf-based group is the supreme institution of Shiite learning in Iraq. Its most prominent leaders today are the moderate Ayatollah Ali Sistani, and the more politically active Moktada Sadr. Mr. Sadr, whose family suffered under the rule of Mr. Hussein, has not been friendly toward the US presence in Iraq and has actively moved to fill the power vacuum left by the collapsed Baath regime.

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