Pentagon iconoclasts

Rumsfeld's recent "Defense Transformation for the 21st Century Act" suggests he is willing to shake up the way the Pentagon operates. The 205-page plan would shift 320,000 military jobs to civilians, freeing up those soldiers for combat duty and making it easier hire civilians outside the civil service system. It would allow top officers to serve longer - or to be ushered out early.

The legislation would also lift the limits on the number of employees Rumsfeld can hire for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and free him from reporting requirements to Congress.

Even as he pushes that plan - which would enhance the authority of the Defense Secretary on the personnel front - Rumsfeld continues to press for changes in weaponry and style of combat.

The success of the Iraq campaign, with its emphasis on flexibility and the use of Special Forces, could bolster his case.

"You liberated a country," he told US troops in Qatar Monday. "How you did it will help transform the way we defend our country in the 21st century."

Yet despite prior experience as Defense Secretary under President Ford, Rumsfeld got off to a rocky start in 2001. Having turned around pharmaceutical firm G.D. Searle prior to returning to the Pentagon, Rumsfeld erred by approaching this second tour as a hostile takeover rather than a friendly Republican homecoming, Mr. Korb says.

Like McNamara, Rumsfeld doesn't seem awed by top military officers, willing to drop generals such as White overboard with little finesse in favor of ones who share his vision for the future.

This has left wounds. Army brass angered him by lobbying Congress behind his back to save the Crusader artillery system. Rumsfeld returned the favor by announcing its cancellation without telling them first.

Harold Brown, Defense secretary under President Carter, says no one in that job, no matter how politically skilled or friendly, can both reform the entrenched defense establishment and keep the career officers who run it happy. "There's going to be tension when you try to change things," says Brown. "A less strong personality can ease that but it does not remove the tension."

It is in the realm of tactical and strategic decisions during the Iraq war that Rumsfeld's assertiveness fueled the most Pentagon tension. Published reports suggested Rumsfeld intervened with military planners about which combat units would deploy to the Persian Gulf and when they'd arrive. Most Defense secretaries leave operational decisions to military leaders.

Rumsfeld has proven equally aggressive in usurping the State Department's traditional diplomatic role. He publicly chastised allies opposed to the war as "Old Europe" and delegated the reconstruction of Iraq to a Defense Department office headed by retired Gen. Jay Garner.

In those actions, Rumsfeld has faced a national icon, Colin Powell, while McNamara competed against a more low-key Secretary of State, Dean Rusk.

Until recently, Rumsfeld seemed chastened by his 2001 budget skirmishes with the military services. He showed less willingness than McNamara to make tough budget decisions, says Andrew Krepinevich, executive director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

Rumsfeld has cancelled only a single major weapon system - the Crusader - and left other items such as the F-22 fighter, the Virginia-class submarine and Comanche attack helicopter unscathed. Krepinevich says Rumsfeld will not be able to postpone much longer the hardest choice associated with transformation: whether to pay for future capabilities by cutting present forces or raise the defense budget to do both at the same time. The former approach means cutting systems that enjoy support in the military and in Congress.

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