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The difficult burden of proof

British Prime Minister Tony Blair Tuesday released a dossier on Iraq's weapons programs.



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By Scott Peterson, Staff Writer of The Christian Science Monitor / September 25, 2002

MOSCOW

To convince the world in 1962 that the USSR was threatening the US by building missiles in Cuba, President John F. Kennedy authorized the release of satellite photos that clearly showed missile construction sites.

While that may have tipped the Soviets off to US intelligence capabilities at the time, any trade-off was deemed to be worth it: The photographs dispelled any doubt that the missile threat was real.

Forty years later, another American president is trying to convince skeptics that Iraq presents a new, critical threat with chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. In an effort to help bolster Bush's case – and silence critics at home of his pro-American stance – British Prime Minister Tony Blair Tuesday made public a long-awaited dossier on Iraq incorporating intelligence sources, circumstantial evidence and previously known data.

Read before an emergency session of parliament, the report said Iraq's chemical and biological weapons are ready for use on 45 minutes' notice. While stopping short of saying Iraq has nuclear weapons, it said Iraq has tried to acquire uranium from Africa, despite having no nuclear power program. According to the dossier – which Baghdad rejected as "scaremongering, exaggeration and lies" – Iraq has also illegally retained up to 20 missiles with a range of 400 miles that can carry chemical or biological weapons, and has tried to extend the range of other, smaller missiles.

Analysts say that making public such information to dispel doubt at home may also inadvertently help the Iraqi regime prepare for conflict. Revealing what the West knows – or doesn't know – experts say, draws a fine line between convincing an uncertain public to go to war and while ensuring that such revelations do not compromise intelligence sources or potential targets.

"You don't really want to tell Saddam what you know already, because he can use that to his own advantage," says Paul Beaver, an independent military analyst based in London.

So far, little hard evidence about Iraq's illegal programs or its alleged links to terrorism has surfaced. A 20-page document released by the Bush administration less than two weeks ago, as evidence that Iraq was due for regime change, contained, like Blair's dossier, little new data, critics say.

Hans Blix, the chief UN weapons inspector, who is overseeing a return of inspectors to Iraq for the first time since late 1998, said there are "many open questions" about Iraq's efforts. "If I had solid evidence that Iraq retained weapons of mass destruction or was constructing such weapons, I would take it to the Security Council," Mr. Blix said earlier this month. "The satellites don't see through roofs. So we are not drawing conclusions from them."

How far the US will go in revealing what it knows is a measure of resolve for an eventual strike, says one official. Andrew Krepinevich, a retired US Army strategic planner, and head of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a Washington military affairs think tank, says: "I think you [reveal all your evidence] when you've made the commitment that you are going to forcibly remove [the threat], one way or another. That's the bridge the administration has crossed."

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