Middle East: The history
How US clout in the Arab world sank so low
RARELY, if ever, since President Truman hastened to recognize the new state of Israel in 1948, have American prestige and leverage been lower in the Middle East.Skip to next paragraph
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The seeming weakness of US muscle perceived by its friends and allies in the area comes from years of disuse.
How did this happen? History has some answers.
First, American inconsistency and indecision. In 1944, eager to bar the German and Japanese enemies from Arabia's rich oil supplies, President Roosevelt met with Saudi Arabian King Abdelazziz ibn Saud aboard the US Navy cruiser Quincy.
A kind of gentleman's agreement denied access to the Arabian Peninsula's oil to the enemy Axis and guaranteed it to the United States. Roosevelt told the Saudi king that the US, without consulting Arab states, would brook no changes in the status of British-mandated Palestine.
Jewish and Arab terrorists and guerrillas soon drove out the British by killing British soldiers. They killed each other, too. Much of world Jewry fervently welcomed the new Israel as a haven from the Holocaust. But Israel was born in conflict with its own Palestinian Arabs, about 300,000 of whom fled or were ejected, and in fighting the ill-equipped external Arab armies. Israel was swiftly recognized, first by Moscow, then by Washington.
For a time, US administrations supported Israel at a distance. Its main helper in the 1950s (once the brief support of the Soviet bloc dried up) was France, from which it purchased secrets and materials it needed to become an undeclared nuclear power.
The lowest point of the fluctuating Israeli influence on the US came with President Eisenhower. After the US pressured Israel's British and French allies to withdraw from Egyptian territory in their unsuccessful 1956 war to seize the Suez Canal, Israel's founding father, David Ben-Gurion, refused to pull Israeli forces out of their new conquests in Sinai and Gaza, as the UN Security Council had ordered.
So Eisenhower, in January 1957, threatened American Jewish leaders and lobbyists with withdrawal of tax-free Israel bond sales and other crucial privileges. Mr. Ben-Gurion reversed himself and withdrew. Respect for the US was high throughout the area, even in Israel.
It sank after President Johnson in 1967 chose to challenge neither an Israeli attack on the US Navy's intelligence ship Liberty, nor the rapid Israeli conquests of territory in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan which followed. President Carter reached an Egyptian-Israeli settlement with the Camp David peace accords, after the Arab-Israel war of 1973. An Arab oil embargo hit Americans with rocketing prices. Massive US military aid rescued an Israel under heavy pressure from the Egyptian and Syrian armies.
Egypt was the first Arab nation to recognize Israel. Subsequent events also offered hope: Israel's first hesitant recognition of limited autonomy for its Palestinian subjects and Jordanian King Hussein's peace treaty with Israel, in 1994. There was US input in both cases.
US-Mideast relations dipped sharply in 1984. President Reagan first sent, then withdrew, a US peacekeeping force in Lebanon. Israeli forces were directed by then-Defense Minister Ariel Sharon to destroy Yasser Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organization in Lebanon. They drove both out, after US mediation. But nearly 250 US marines and some of the CIA's best Mideast operatives were killed by truck bombs in Beirut. This terrorism was the work of Shi'ite Arab militants, controlled by the successful clerical Muslim revolutionaries in Iran, who had taken US hostages both there and in Lebanon.