There are many differences between American and European politics. But there is one thing they have in common. Both are often challenged by their reliance on corporate money.

Of late, the Enron affair has served as an increasingly painful reminder to Americans of the role money plays in politics. During the same period, a crowd of 40,000 Italians gathered recently in Milan to remember the 10th anniversary of Tangentopoli (Bribesville) - an astonishing revelation of corruption in Italian politics. Tangentopoli is the key to understanding the type of system which later brought shame on such European politicians as François Mitterand, Helmut Kohl, and Jacques Chirac.

Traditionally, Italy has one of the largest shares of state-owned or controlled companies of all West European countries. Their top managers are almost exclusively political appointees who, once getting a lucrative job, were expected to help fill up their party's treasuries. "If you want to count in politics, you have to bring money to your party," wrote Socialist parliament member Andrea Moroni, defending his public role in a 1992 farewell letter before committing suicide.

In early 1992, a team of Italian investigators uncovered a simple mechanism that was pumping money into politics: Everyone who got a contract with a state company had to pay a kickback to its managers. The money (in most cases) was dutifully consigned to the political parties. Contractors included the extra expense in their overhead, passing the bill on to the taxpayers.

The US system seems more transparent, allowing corporate "political action committees" to finance politics on a transparent legal basis. But the result is similar: The corporations expect politicians to pay back the favor.

In Italy, he "mother of all bribes" was nearly $80 million paid in the late 1990s by the private energy firm Montedison in an attempt to merge with state-owned Enichem. To make the political environment friendly for the creation of the new energy giant, Enimont, each party got its chunk - some bigger, some smaller. Taxpayers suffered again: State managers overestimated privately owned Montedison by up to $400 million, undervaluing the state's share in the newborn Enimont.

Discovery of the Enimont maxibribe was followed by two executive suicides in three days, complicating the investigation. It was clear that many highly respected people did not realize the moral, not to mention criminal, consequences of their actions.

"Everybody knew, everybody was silent. Who will cast the first stone?" asked Bettino Craxi, the leader of the Italian Socialist Party in July 1992. The symbol of Italian corruption, Mr. Craxi had a simple message: In blaming the entire system no one should feel guilty. (He was soon forced to depart for his extravagant Tunisian exile, where he later died.) Will a similar approach be taken by Wall Street in the Enron scandal?

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