Why Saudis won't change tune
(Page 2 of 2)
The official response to the committee was swift. Neither the ruling family nor religious leaders wanted to contend with a second extremist threat. Religious leaders denounced the committee as illegal. The strong reaction was consistent with King Fahd's warning - which stressed his opposition to such movements - despite repeated calls for greater respect for individual human rights. Subsequently, the regime cracked down on Salafis.
In the meantime, and throughout much of the 1980s, Saudis tacitly approved, even encouraged, hundreds of their citizens - including Osama bin Laden - to continue their jihad from Afghanistan against the Soviet Union.
What was remarkable, however, was that the Saudi monarchy also came under attack by progressive groups, including Saudis educated abroad. Their goals included more acceptance of Western ideas, less strict adherence to Islamic tenets, greater freedom for women, and availability of alcohol.
Like the Islamists' views, progressive ideas pose equally corrosive threats to the House of Saud. If the monarchy's claim to power rests on its judgment that it alone is best suited to apply a traditionalist conservative interpretation of Islam, then liberalizers directly contradict the family's claim to rule.
Caught between extremes, the House of Saud must temper its reaction to ideological challenges while seeking to please Western allies. For Saudi rulers, effective policies must balance internal constraints - ranging from an increasingly awakened public opinion to growing regional and international requirements - with what Westerners may view as socio-political emancipation. For the West, stability in the kingdom is essential to the free flow of oil.
In 2001, Saudi Arabia holds an estimated quarter of the world's reserves of petroleum. In keeping with a traditional monarchy - in which the ruler remains supreme religious leader - the custodianship of the holy mosques at Mecca and Medina confer on the Saudi ruler unparalleled legitimacy.
If American policymakers had any doubts about Saudi commitments to Persian Gulf security, they were erased after the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, when the Saudis joined the alliance to defeat Saddam Hussein. After the Sept. 11 attacks, Saudi Arabia has again shown that its interests coincide with the West's, that it needs allies to protect conservative Arab Gulf regimes from regional hegemons, and that the relationship is of mutual economic benefit.
To be sure, the Saudis have disagreed with some Western allies over the Arab-Israeli conflict, even though they've never allowed that crisis to damage long-term Saudi-Western ties. The US cannot afford to place the Saudi ruling family at risk, even if some US officials may be fed up with Saudi policies.
At stake are global economic issues over oil. Also at stake is the future of the Saudi ruling family. Committing suicide, by catering to narrow Western objectives, is not in the offing.
Joseph A. Kechichian is a fellow at the Center of Near Eastern Studies (UCLA) and the author of 'Succession in Saudi Arabia' (Palgrave, 2001).
Page:
1 | 2




