Why Saudis won't change tune

In its effort to curb the spread of anti-American hatred, Washington has called on Saudi Arabia to end certain activities, including financial support of extremist Islamic institutions. Less erudite critics have called on the Saudi regime to "stop lying" to the United States.

But Saudi leaders are not going to commit suicide, which is where Western demands would likely lead. Simply stated, Saudi Arabia cannot change its traditional doctrines: Doing so would mean the end of Al Saud rule - and the end of stable oil prices. Senior members of the ruling family have a "will to power" that will likely withstand the current crisis.

This "will to power," based on ideological justifications advanced to legitimate the elite's rule, probably took its current form after the epoch-making takeover of the mosque at Mecca in 1979. The rebels condemned the ruling family, accusing it of corruption and befriending Western infidels. They also called for eradication of Western influence in the kingdom, including television. The group held out for three weeks before its members were flushed out by Saudi troops, aided by Jordanian volunteers and French counterterrorism advisers. Sixty-three rebels survived the assault. All were publicly executed.

This incident illustrated that the Saudi regime had underestimated dissent in the kingdom; The rebels hailed from a broad spectrum within the population. Few dissenters were deterred by internal security forces, and even more telling, their armaments came from Saudi military stocks. The fact that armed forces personnel may have been involved in the uprising led the ruling family to purge suspected Air Force, tank, and infantry services.

The Mecca incident forced the House of Saud to take measures aimed at preventing future uprisings. "Mecca showed us we could be caught off guard," opined a senior family member.

Since then, Saudi monarchs have embarked on an unprecedented campaign to accommodate dissent and control the political damage from the uprising. The House of Saud provided generous grants for land purchases and outright loans to many ordinary citizens. They agreed to cooperate with the religious leaders more closely on security.

Yet even before the mosque takeover, Sunni Muslim extremism had gained prominence in Saudi Arabia, starting in the early 1960s, after its failures in Egypt. Known as the Salafi movement, its adherents accused the House of Saud of encouraging the erosion of Muslim values and giving tacit approval to the corruption that accompanied modernization.

Extremist believers further opposed giving greater rights to Shia Muslims. As Saudi rulers embarked on improved ties with Shias in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Sunni extremists feared that accommodation between the ruling family and members of the Shia minority sect would single out the Salafi movement for retribution.

After the 1991 war for Kuwait, Sunni extremism against the ruling family grew again, as Salafis demanded political reforms and criticized Saudi reliance on Western forces. In 1993, Salafis announced the creation of a human rights group - the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights - to eliminate injustice, support the oppressed, and defend the rights prescribed by Islamic law in the kingdom.

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