A more dangerous Afghanistan

Many Arabs were disappointed by their Afghan experiences. In general, Afghans were willing to take Arab funding, but disliked the arrogance of their Islamic brothers. They also resented Arab efforts, later implemented by the Taliban, to enforce a form of Islam that had little to do with Afghan culture. Mujahideen leaders such as Massoud, whom I first met in 1981, welcomed foreign Muslims, but only if they respected the Afghan way of life.

After the Taliban's rise in 1994, growing numbers of militants headed back to Afghanistan as part of a growing Islamic "foreign legion." According to Western intelligence, they now represent one-quarter to one-half of the Taliban's force of at least 40,000. While the majority are young, partially educated Pakistanis from religious schools across the border, many are from the Mideast and North Africa, Malaysia, Central Asia, Chechnya, and China. Some come from Muslim communities in Britain, Germany, France, and elsewhere.

While bin Laden himself owns a sumptuous villa in the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar, he is believed to operate a number of mountain redoubts and bases inside eastern Afghanistan, with 2,000 to 3,000 well-equipped Arab combatants under his command. The Taliban controls about 70 percent of the country.

Journalists who have met bin Laden say he has virtually no Afghans in his entourage. However, opposition sources maintain that he and his forces are increasingly dominating the war effort against the rest of Afghanistan. For them, bin Laden has become the de facto minister of war for the Taliban.

Much of bin Laden's support for the Taliban has been in the form of raising funds to pay commanders to join the movement. No doubt, his money helps to ensure that his Afghan hosts will keep protecting him. His reported offer of one of his daughters in marriage to Taliban leader Mullah Omar has probably helped cement his relationship with Afghan tribal leaders.

It is doubtful how effective military attacks on Afghanistan would be. Previous American missile attacks against bin Laden's bases did little to weaken his operations. America is correct to pressure Pakistan. But some Afghans think the US should adopt a more Afghan approach by placing, and publicizing, a price on the heads of bin Laden and his principal followers, prompting Afghans to act.

Perhaps the most effective approach would be to finally elaborate a sound regional policy that would end the war in Afghanistan. In this manner, Afghans themselves could take matters into their own hands.

Edward Girardet, a former Monitor correspondent, is editor of the Essential Field Guide to Afghanistan, published by Crosslines. His report on his recent trip to Afghanistan will appear in the December issue of National Geographic.

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