Clinton Needs Approval of Congress on Haiti

ONCE again the United States stands on the precipice of war; this time with the Caribbean nation of Haiti. US military intervention in Haiti may be the best or even the only way to remove the coup leaders and ``restore democracy.'' However, the decision to invade cannot and should not be made by President Clinton alone.

To do so would violate the specific circumstances enumerated by America's constitutional framers under which the president may unilaterally deploy US military forces abroad. In the Haitian case, there is no sudden attack to repel, nor is there an international emergency or crisis of immediate consequence to US citizens, property, or sovereignty. Hence, Mr. Clinton is obliged to ask Congress for either a declaration of war against Haiti or a joint resolution authorizing the use of military force before proceeding with an invasion of Haiti.

The framers of the republic appreciated the authority needed by the executive branch to repel sudden attacks and respond to international emergencies. George Washington's warning about entangling alliances notwithstanding, the framers knew necessity would occasionally require the executive to act unilaterally in defense of the nation.

But the framers were fearful of vesting the sole power to make war in either the Senate or the executive, and decided instead to give Congress - the House and Senate - the power to declare war. Their reasoning was clear, as Maj. Pierce Butler of South Carolina, delegate to the Constitutional Convention, explained in 1788: ``It was at first proposed to vest the sole power of making peace or war in the Senate; but this was objected to as inimical to the genius of a republic, by destroying the necessary balance they were anxious to preserve. Some gentlemen were inclined to give this power to the president; but it was objected to, as throwing into his hands the influence of a monarch, having an opportunity of involving his country in war whenever he wished to promote her destruction.''

Consequently, the convention delegates decided that Congress was the best place to safely lodge the power to ``make war.'' Yet during subsequent deliberation in 1787, this language was changed to ``declare war'' as a concession to the likelihood that the president would, on occasion, be required to take military action without congressional authorization - to repel sudden attacks against the nation, in response to a crisis, or when Congress was not in session.

The framers expected such executive actions to be exceptional, not ordinary or standard practice. Decades of ``gunboat diplomacy,'' however, have weakened the constraint once imposed by this expectation on unilateral presidential action. Indeed, most Americans, including Clinton, probably assume that the Constitution grants sweeping discretion to the president as commander in chief to commit American troops to battle without specific authorization from Congress.

This assumption is inaccurate and dangerous. America's framers believed the decision to wage war against another nation, even a much weaker one, was best undertaken by Congress, given its capacity for deliberation and direct linkage to the American people. Indeed, Alexander Hamilton favorably compared the war-making responsibilities of Congress to those of the British monarch: ``[The authority] of the British king extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulation of fleets and armies - all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature.'' Congress, not the president, was to have the same responsibilities for making war as did the British monarch.

However, this view is as foreign to modern presidents as it is to most members of Congress and the American people. This helps explain why presidents, including Clinton, are reluctant to seek approval from Congress for military interventions and why Congress is hesitant, at best, to take initiative in foreign policy.

The role Congress should play in conducting war is also evident from Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to raise and support armies and requires that ``no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years.'' In other words, even after Congress has declared war, giving the president as commander in chief the authority to wage war, this decision must still be revisited every two years.

Under the Constitution, Congress, not the president, has the primary responsibility for deciding when the nation should go to war. The president's responsibilities are limited to conducting the war, once authorized by an act of Congress, as commander in chief of the nation's armed forces. Admittedly, this view has been contradicted by more than 220 US military interventions during the nation's history that have been ordered unilaterally by dozens of US presidents. However, a multitude of bad precedents is no excuse for another unconstitutional action by this president.

The UN Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of ``all necessary means,'' including force, to depose the Haitian military regime is no substitute for a congressional declaration of war and should not be viewed as one by Clinton. Legally, this resolution cannot supersede the US Constitution. Hence, it cannot be used by the president as authority to wage war in Haiti absent a specific congressional authorization.

Clinton's apparent reluctance to ask Congress to begin debate on a possible invasion of Haiti silences the collective voice of the American people and contributes to the further aggrandizement of presidential power in foreign affairs. If an invasion of Haiti is justified to accomplish important foreign-policy goals, Clinton should go before Congress to request authority for the use of US forces. Likewise, Congress owes the Constitution framers and the American people a debate and timely decision before war in Haiti is a fait accompli.

Whether either branch of government will fulfill, rather than ignore, its constitutional responsibilities in the weeks ahead remains to be seen. The Opinion/Essay Page welcomes manuscripts. Authors of articles we accept will be notified by telephone. Authors of articles not accepted will be notified by postcard. Send manuscripts to Opinions/Essays, One Norway Street, Boston, MA 02115, by fax to 617 -450-2317, or by Internet E-mail to OPED@RACHEL.CSPS.COM.